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EASTERN

F.O. 371

194



PALESTINE

Fine No. 951


pp. 9487 - 9666

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61882

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AMENDMENT SLIP.

CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

Telegram No. 508 of 11th October from Amman to Foreign Office.

Line 4 of text should read "of the Arab League at Aley on October 9th and shown.."

Communications Department.

15th October 1947.



THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

.87

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE 13 OUT

Sir A. Kirkbride

D. 8.16 p.m. 11th October, 1947

No. 303 11th October, 1947.

R. 10.55 p.m. 11th October, 1947

Repeated to U.K. Delegation New York

Bagdad Cairo Jedda B.M.E.O. Damascus

Beirut (please pass to Damascus as my telegram No.78)
Jerusalem Saving

IMMEDIATE SECRET'

Meeting of Arab League.

In continuation of my immediately preceding telegram following is a translation of decision taken by the Sub-Council of the Arab League at [gp. undec.] on October 9th and shown to me by King Abdullah today.

[Begins].

"The special Sub-Committee composed of Heads of respective delegations, has discussed the problem referred to it by League Council regarding measures which should be taken to defend Palestine in the light of recent developments in the general situation and future possibilities. The Sub-Committee has taken into consideration the announcement by the British Government about the policy which will be followed in Palestine by Britain in its capacity as a mandatory Government. The Sub-Committee has reviewed all past [gp. undec.] and decisions which were taken by League Council as well as these proposed by Political Committee. Sub-Committee has decided unanimously to submit to the Council following recommendations in relation to matters which have been discussed up to this day.

(1) With reference to secret Bludan decisions which were to be carried out if report of Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry was accepted and recommendations contained therein implemented, the Sub-Committee consider that the decisions are still valid and should be executed in the event of any selution being imposed violating Palestine's right to be an

/independent

independent Arab State.

- (2) As the British Government has declared recently its decision to abandon the mandate over Palestine and to withdraw its military forces and administrative machinery and in view of the fact that Zionist forces and their terrorist organisations constitute a real threat to the Arabs of Palestine, therefore [sic] the Sub-Committee considers the situation requires member States of the Arab League to take military precautions on the Palestine frontier. For this purpose, the Sub-Committee suggest that the Council should recommend the Arab States to hasten to take these military precautions and to ask the States bordering on Palestine to allow those States which have no common frontier therewith to participate in this duty. This point is to be agreed upon by the respective States direct.
- that active assistance should be accorded to the Arabs of Palestine, the Sub-Committee suggest that the Council should recommend the member States to accelerate the grant of moral and material assistance to the Arabs of Palestine to strengthen and to support them in defending themselves and their own existence. It recommends that the Council should request the member States to provide immediately the funds necessary for this end. These funds will be controlled by a special committee".

[Ends].

Foreign Office please pass to U.K. Belegation New York, Bagdad, Cairo, Jedda and B.M.E.O. as my telegrams Nos. 5, 54, 90, 53 and 42 respectively.

[Repeated to U.K. Delegation New York, Bagdad, Caire, Jedda and B.M.E.O.]

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Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM DAMASCUS TO FOREIGN OFFICE 13 OCT

Mr. Dundas.

No. 459

D. 5.46 p.m. llth October, 1947

R. 8.50 p.m. llth October, 1947

Repeated to Amman; Bagdad; Beirut; Cairo;) All Jedda; Middle East Minister;) Saving Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean)

CONFI DENTIAL

In the absence of Jamil Mardam in Beirut on Arab League business, I today called on the Minister of the Interior and Minister of Defence to enquire into movements of Syrian troops and security forces.

- Minister and was uncommunicative. He vaguely referred to the decision taken on October 9th by the Arab League. The latter stated that he was holding manoeuvres in the Qunaitra area, of Damascus "division" of not more than 5,000 men. This was, he said, a good time of the year and a good opportunity to exercise the troops who normally lived in barracks and he would be able to find out how the military machine worked, in the field and what was missing. Both spoke to me of British troop withdrawals having already taken place from Palestine and of Transjordan forces having taken over in North Palestine.
- question of British troops or Britih administration being withdrawn from Palestine except in accordance with Secretary of State for the Colonies' statement, and that, until such withdrawal took place, Government of Palestine was responsible for the administration, defence and security of Palestine; any action taken against Palestinian subjects or any territorial incursion could only be considered as action against the Government of Palestine. I added that in my opinion the sending of Syrian troops to the neighbourhood of the frontier was provocative and would probably result in causing a deterioration of the internal situation of Palestine, a matter which directly affected His Majesty's Government.
- 4. It would be useful to have material here for denial of British troops withdrawal from Palestine and details of Transjordan troop movements if any.

k k k



Registry No. E 9500/951/31

TO X XeX Yet. P. XXB DBC Confidential. PASSETCE & **SPANK**

Draft.

Damascus

Telegrafn.

Repeat to:

Amman Bagdad. Beirut. Cairo / B.M.E.O. Cairo 368 U.K. Delegation New York 3630 Washington 10979

W. O. concer. C.J. concur

Code. Cypher.

Distribution :—

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OUT FILE

F. O.,

Despatched

Your telegram No. 439 _ of 11th October: Syrian troop movements, fore . 4.

There has been no withdrawal of British troops from/Palestine recently. Moreover, of the troops at present stationed in northern Palestine, approximately 85% are British and 9% belong to Transjordan Frontier Force (which is being renamed the Palestine Frontier Force). Only about 6% belong to the Arab Legion. These proportions have remained substantially the same for some (discrect, time.

2. You may make use of this information to correct/inaccurate reports.

OFFICE, LONDO 61882

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E 9500/951/31 Confidential Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGH OFFICE TO DAMASCUS

No.542

D.1.40 p.m. 24th October, 1947. 23rd October, 1947.

Repeated to Amman No. 466

Bagdad No.914 Beirut No.659 Cairo No.1969

Jedda No.436 Jerusalem

British Middle East Office Cairo No.788 U.K. Delegation New York No. 3630 Washington No. 10979

CONFIDENTIAL

Your telegram No.439 [of 11th October: Syrian troop movements], paragraph 4.

There has been no withdrawal of British troops from Northern Palestine recently. Moreover, of the troops at present stationed in Northern Palestine, approximately 85% are British and 9% belong to Transjordan Frontier Force (which is being renamed the Palestine Frontier Force). Only about 6% belong to the Arab Legion. These proportions have remained substantially the same for some time.


2. You may make discreet use of this information te cerrect any inaccurate reperts.

В В В В

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

Cypher (O.T.P.)



FROM PALESTINE (Gen. Sir A. Cunningham)

D. 28th October, 1947.

R. 28th

11.25 hrs.

IMMEDIATE

No. 2010 Confidential.

Addressed to H.M. Minister, Damascus, No. 1483. Repeated to S. of S.

Amman,

No. 3484. Ho. Baghdad, No. 1485. Beirut,

Foreign Office telegram No. 542 to you.

Please make no mention of proposal to rename Trans-Jordan Frontier Force the Palestine Frontier Force.

Copies sent to:-

Foreign Office - Communications Department THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

(Action completed.) Next Paper.

91-09

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

En Clair

WORLD ORGANI ATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE (From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2892

D. 1.56 p.m. 12th October, 1947

12th October, 1947.

R. 8.41 p.m. 12th October, 1947

Repeated Immediate to Jerusalem Washington Saving

E 2501

IMEDIATE GLANT

13 OFT

My telegram Ne. 2876.

Palestine Committee.

Mrs. Pandit was the first speaker at the 11th meeting on 11th October. In her view the first task of the Committee was to simplify the Palestine problem by eliminating from it the problem of displaced persons in Europe. The Indian Government favoured the creation of an independent Arab state in Palestine in which Jews would enjoy wide powers of autonomy in the areas in which they predominated.

- 2. Herschel Johnson then made the statement contained in my telegram No. 2861.
- 3. Tsiang (China) said that the Chinese were unable to understand anti-semitism er Zienism. U.N.S.C.O.P.'s sixth recommendation deserved immediate attention. Only when the member states had decided to make propertional contributions to the settlement of displaced persons and when full weight had been given to the special position of the Arabs in Palestine would there be any "meral cogency" in an appeal to Arab generasity on behalf of the Jewish National Home. As to the means of assisting the development of the National Home the Chinese delegation had no particular preference. They regretted the attitude of the arab Higher Committee to partition, but the Committee must bear in mind the possibility of conflict and bloodshed if an attempt were made to impose any plan without first making every effort to narrow the gulf between the two peoples. If this were not done the Assembly would be deviating from the objectives of the Charter. A further effort at conciliation was therefore imperative.
- pre-history of the subject. Replying to the American statement on behalf of the Arab delegations he declared that a Jewish State could not be viable without foreign support. It was by means of American dollars that the Sionists had created "symptoms of prosperity" in Palestine. They would always be dependent on Jewish capitalists in New York. The most reprehensible suggestion in the commercian statement was that for

in the camer

/an

an international volunteer force. Of whom was this force to be composed and who had suggested it? The arabs would not turn the left check after being struck on the right. They accepted the challenge which had been made at an earlier meeting by Dr. Silver, himself an American citizen, and which had been confirmed today by the spekesman of his Government. Have a confirmed that the proposal for the formation of a Faris Bey maintained that the proposal for the formation of a Jewish State washingensistent with Article 80 of the Charter since it exceeded the provisions of the mandate and was not embedied in a trusteeship agreement. He announced that the Arab delegations would submit a proposal to ask the International Court for an opinion on this point in accordance with Article 96 of the Charter.

5. Add (Persia) announced the opposition of his Government to partition and to any solution which was not compatible with the Charter.

Fereign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 90.

[Cepies sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

E9515

Next Paper.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

E 0508

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Evans No. 735

October 11th, 1947.

D. 4.20 p.m. October 11th, 1947.
R. 7.55 p.m. October 11th, 1947.

Repeated to British Middle East Office Cairo, United Kingdom Delegation New York and Saving to Bagdad, Jedda, Jerusalem, Amman and Damascus.

SECRET PALESTINE

The President of the Republic sent for me on October 10th and said he wished to speak about three subjects; Palestine, the arrival of the ex-Mufti and the Egyptian problem. He said that he had already given me his personal views on Colonial Secretary's statement (reported in my telegram No. 701). Since that time he had sounded public opinion and had taken the opportunity of the calls which the heads of the delegations to the Arab League Council had paid him to ascertain their reactions. He said there was no doubt that the Arabs appreciated the attitude of His Majesty's Government as indicated in the statement but they realised that the new policy of defence imposed heavy obligations on them.

- 2. He said he wished to give an assurance that any military dispositions taken by the Lebanon in accordance with the Arab League Council's decision would, under no circumstances be directed against British forces as long as they remained in Palestine. The other Arab leaders were he was sure, inspired by the same sentiments.
- 3. I thanked His Excellency and said I would convey his assurances to you.
 - 4. Please see my two immediately following telegrams.

Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation New York as my telegram No. 31 and British Middle East Office Cairo as my telegram No. 183.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York and British Middle East Office Cairo]

SSSSS



Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

95-07

Next Paper.

(Action completed.)

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM BAGDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

AND NEW YORK (U.K. Delegation to United Nations)

Mr. Pelham.

D. 6.35.a.m. October 13th, 1947.

No. 945.

October 11th, 1947.

R. 8.54.a.m. October 13th, 1947.

Repeated Saving to Beirut,

Cairo.

Anman.

Damascus.

Jerusalem.

B.M.E.O. Cairo.

E 9515

14 OCT

Restricted.

Arab League.

First reaction to Azzam's statement to the press that the Egyptian and Syrian armies are moving up to the Palestine frontier is one of unthinking enthusiasm.

- 2. Director General of Ministry of Foreign
 Affairs informed the Oriental Councillor this morning
 that enquiries of Egyptian and Syrian Minister of
 Defence had revealed that the Egyptian Ministry knew
 nothing of any such move, while the Syrian Ministry had
 merely strengthened their frontier dispositions in
 order to control suspected Jewish moves across the border.
- 3. The Director General has no official reports so far from the Iraqi delegation to the Arab League meeting.

Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation as my telegram No. 12.

[Repeated to New York.]

66666





16 OCT 1947

Recd. 14 Oct 47.

From: - C in C MELF

D.T.O. 141125 Oct.

War Office To:-

EMERGENCY

GI/21067. SECRET.

Reliable source reports concentration Syria. Onc. Not exceeding three thousand area QNAITRA (R) 227283 (R) with detachments at Ain Ziouane (R) 226278 (R) at Jouaize (R) on main road six miles south QMAITRA (R) and at Khochniye (R) 226268 (R).

Nothing observed Lebanese frontier. Lebanon. TWO.

Iraq. Government calling meeting of tribal Three. chiefs Hilla (R) Oct 22 to make decision regarding defence of Palestine.

Mossage Control. Distribution by MI3a DDMI(I) Copies to: - CIGS VCIGS MI3,3n(2),11DMO Foreign Office (Mr Beith Eastern $DDMO(\Lambda)$ Dept) . MO1,4 Colonial Office (Lt Col Chalmers) DMI

PALESTINE

E 9517

(TE CABLE)

Subject

Wi Nurdas Namarcus.

Received

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442 13,0ct

Lyrian Green, "Manaeuvres". In new of romour of Bretish Freezes unpolraming already from Palisting, and of Kranjardan Forces tokens aver a Morth of authorised Employed to make it

clear that inthologousal, dirended any authonoation to celle function of the work along.

Last Paper.

9515

References.

(Print.)

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8, Matheron - 6.0. Oct 18

(Action completed.)

Next Paper.

The communique which Mr. Devolas wisher to issue to when a statement of the obvious, but it can to no horm. I think me slæld agree and submit drokt

The Times has come out with a reasonable statement of position this morning, based on what News Dept. Lave told them. I hardly think this Communiqué is ocquired for Our pur poses here but mo Pundus must be the ment judge I) What win be useful to cally, Colonial Otrie Conen

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

Subject to the omission of the last that we cannot be responsible for last and order after the first day of with drawal. The new wording is more non-committal Off-14

This was discussed in a meeting in Gia B. Sargent's room and it was decided to inclind the Dundas not to issure a dements.

A aft: let: has been enhunted.

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Cypher/OTP

E 9517

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

14 OCT

FROM DAMASCUS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Dundas No: 442 D. 3.43.p.m.13th October 1947

R. 4.50.p.m. 13th October 1947

111

Repeated to Jerusalem

13th October 1947

MOST DAMEDIATE

My telegram No: 439.

incidents arising from Syrian Army "manaeuvres" coupled with rapid spreading of rumours that British forces were already in process of withdrawal from Palestine and that Transjordan forces were taking over in the North, I authorised Information Officer of this Legation to make it clear through his press contacts that our eventual withdrawal from Palestine depended on circumstances set out in Secretary of State for the Colonies' statement of September 26th. Meanwhile the Government of Palestine were entirely responsible for administration and defence of Palestine.

2. Two Damascus newspapers yesterday carried a similar statement, a translation of which is given in my immediately following telegram.

speculation and to minimise the risk that popular enthusiasm might get out of hand I should be glad to be authorised to issue, after obtaining agreement of Syrian Government, a communique to Damascus press in following terms "British Legation states that on October 11th [grp.undec? British] Charge d'Affaires called on Syrian Minister for Defence and reminded him that in the view of His Majesty's Government responsibility for administration and defence of Palestine remains with the Government of Palestine until the withdrawal referred to in Secretary of State for Colonies' statement of September 26th takes place.

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Reference: 373 61882

No.

Registry

Top Secret. Secret. Confidential. Restricted.

Draft.

Open.

H.M. Chargé d'Affaires, Damascus.

Telegrant.

Repeat to:-

Jerusalem

E**n Xia**ir. Cypher.

Distribution :---

Cabinet

Copies to:

Your telegram No. 442 / of 13th October: Syria and Palestine7.

I should prefer that you do not (repeat not) issue any communiqué to the press on the lines suggested.

2. Situation would appear already to have been made sufficiently clear. "The Times" of 14th October carried a report by the Diplomatic Correspondent on your meeting with the Syrian Ministers of the Interior and Defence, explaining that you took the opportunity of explaining the present British position in Palestine in thelight of the Colonial Secretary's statement to the United Nations and that you made it clear that the Palestine Government was still responsible for law and order in Palestine and would remain

so until withdrawalhad been effected.

3. For your own/information it is not yet clear at precisely what stage, in our withdrawal from Palestine, our responsibility for law and order would come to an end.

Brogo?

WRITTEN

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Secret

Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO DAMASCUS

No.523 14th October, 1947 D. 2.10 a.m. 15th October, 1947

Repeated to Jerusalem

IMMEDIATE SECRET

Your telegram No. 442 [of 13th October: Syria and Palestine].

I should prefer you not (repeat not) to issue any communiqué to the press on the lines suggested.

- 2. Situation is already sufficiently clear. "The Times" of 14th October carried a report by the Diplomatic Correspondent on your meeting with the Syrian Ministers of the Interior and Defence, saying that you took the opportunity of explaining the present British position in Palestine in the light of the Colonial Secretary's statement to the United Nations and that you made it clear that the Palestine Government was still responsible for law and order in Palestine and would remain so until withdrawal had been effected.
- 3. For your own secret information it is not yet clear at precisely what stage, in event of our withdrawal from Palestine, our responsibility for law and order would come to an end.

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E 25

BRITISH EMBASSY,

E 0540

WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

9th October 1947

Ref: 15/326/47

Dear Department,

14 OCT 9//

Our letter 15/303/47 of the 23rd September about American comment on the UNSCOP report.

- 2. According to newspaper reports, a number of State Governors and the Democratic Party Chairman in the State of New York have now sent telegrams to President Truman urging that the U.S. Government support the majority recommendations of the Special Committee.
- 3. One telegram was signed by twenty-three Governors and said:

"The undersigned Governors wholeheartedly endorse the majority report of the United Nations Palestine Committee as an equitable compromise, giving at least some satisfaction to legitimate Jewish needs and respectfully urge, Mr. President, that the American delegation at the United Nations General Assembly be instructed to give full and vigorous support to that report."

It was signed by the following Governors: Folsom of Alabama; Osborn of Arizona; McConaughy of Connecticut; Green of Illinois; Gates of Indiana; Davis of Louisiana; Lane of Maryland; Youngdahl of Minnesota; Ford of Montana; Pittman of Nevada; Dale of New Hampshire; Driscoll of New Jersey; Snell of Oregon; Duff of Pennsylvania; Pastore of Rhode Island; Thurmond of S. Carolina; McCord of Tennessee; Jester of Jexas; Maw of Utah; Wallgren of Washington; Meadows of W. Virginia; Rennebohm of Wisconsin; and Hunt of Wyoming.

/Individual

Eastern Department, Foreign Office, London, S.W.1.

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OFFICE,

Individual messages in the same sense were sent by Governors Warren of California, Knous of Colorado, Bradford of Massachusetts, Sigler of Michigan and Turner of Oklahoma.

A joint letter was also sent by Governors Carlson of Kansas, Donnelly of Missouri and Gibson of Vermont, expressing their fullest sympathy with the national aspirations of the Jewish people and urging that the United States use its political and moral prestige to obtain a just decision in consonance with the traditional attitude of the U.S. Government. Individual letters to the same effect were sent by Governors Caldwell of Florida, Blue of Iowa, Mabry of New Mexico and Tuck of Virginia.

It is interesting to note that the dispatch of these messages was announced by the American Zionist Emergency Council and it is legitimate to suppose that that organization had something to do with persuading all these Governors that this was a wise move to make.

In New York the State Chairman of the Democratic Party made a statement on October 6th, of which the text is enclosed.

We are sending copies of this letter to Jerusalem and to the U.K. Delegation at New York.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY

Statement of Paul E. Fitzpatrick, State Chairman of the Democratic Party of New York.

The deep concern of the people of this State, both Jewish and non-Jewish, in arriving at a solution of the important problem of Palestine now under consideration by the General Assembly of the United Nations, calls for a statement of the position of the Democratic party of this state.

The Democratic party, in both its last national and state platforms, pledged itself to support the establishment of a free, democratic Jewish State in Palestine in accordance with the Balfour Declaration. These platform pledges are in keeping with the traditional position of the Democratic party since the pronouncements of President Woodrww Wilson. I am glad to call attention also that the Republican party has made similar pledges, thus making the policy of this Government virtually bi-partisan.

The opportunity is now here for the American people and the American Government to carry out these pledges. The Special Committee established by the United Nations has brought in a report which is in the nature of a compromise. I note that the Jewish Agency has indicated to the United Nations that it is prepared substantially to accept the compromise solution embodied in the report. Secretary of State Marshall has already stated that great weight must be given to this report.

As chairman of the Democratic Party of the State of New York, I express unequivocally the sentiment that the majority report should be adopted and its provisions carried out not only as an obligation to carry out our pledges but because this is a measure within the scope of the United Nations for which that great instrumentality has been designed to bring about the settlement of a difficult problem.

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PALESTINE

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1947

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TELEGRAM FROM

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Last Paper.

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F8561

(Minutes.)

It has only lately Seemed likely that the Somet Coot. would come out in favour of partition, which must alienate the Arab Crooks. For once they are in Step with the U.S. Crook!

we may soon see rather more clearly the reasons for this Soviet decision. At present they are obscure.

Northerne Sept.

NN (A01.) Dept.

3,5- Beins Grt. 14

another joie for the Soviet Jinger.

A should think. Crakery

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

Bout-

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2905

D. 11.30 p.m. 13th October, 1947.

13th October, 1947.

R. 6.10 a.m. 14th October, 1947.

Repeated to : Jerusalem

Washington - Saving

E 9549

IMMEDIATE GLANT

My telegram No. 2892: Palestine Committee.

1. Tsarapkin (U.S.S.R.) was the first speaker at the 12th meeting on the 15th October. He said it would be unjust to deny the Jewish desire for an independent State. Both of the solutions proposed by U.N.S.C.O.P. were in accordance with the proposals outlined by the Soviet Delegation at the special session of the Assembly. The Soviet Delegation agreed with U.N.S.C.O.P's. unanimous recommendations. Of their two specific plans the minority plan was under present circumstances not practicable. They therefore favoured partition in the hope that economic union would develop in the course of time into a While supporting the majority plan closer political union. in principle the Seviet Delegation considered that it required emendment in respect of the proposed frontiers, the form of administration during the transition period and the status of U.N.S.C.O.P. had not been able to work out the frontiers with sufficient care and should be asked to reconsider this aspect of its work.

- 2. Zafrullah Khan (Pakistan) delivered an extensive reply to the Guatemalan speech which involved a recapitulation of much historical argument. In the course of this part of his speech he asked why His Majesty's Government had not put an end to the controversy about the relevance to Palestine of the Hussein-McMahon correspondence by publishing the instructions given to McMahon. He reiterated his opposition to partition but added that if this solution were agreed upon boundaries should be so drawn as to include roughly the same number of Arabs in the Jewish State as Jews in the Arab State. Member States which helped to earry partition into effect would become parties to a contravention of the Charter.
- J. Fawzi Bey (Egypt) maintained that the statement of the United States delegate was discordant with the American tradition of justice. He challenged the right of the United Nations to decree the partition of Palestine or any other country. The Assembly could only make recommendations to Governments and they could only dispose of what belonged to them. The proposed international police force would be composed almost wholly of Jewish volunteers. The statement made by the Colonial Secretary

had

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had implied the assumption that the recommendations of the General Assembly might be unjust. Was it surprising that the Arabs refused to give up their right to resist an unjust proposal? This was not a threat but a warning.

4. Hosayn Aziz (Afghanistan) announced the opposition of his Government to partition and to any solution contrary to the Charter.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 91.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office, for repetition to Jerusalem.]

MM

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry No.

Top Secret.

Confidential. Restricted.

Secret.

Open.

Gp. 620

THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

En clair

32 FILES

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK.

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations).

Ne. 3472. 14th October 1947.

D. 8.3 p.m. 14th Seteber 1947.

IMMEDIATE.

Your telegram No. 2905 [of 13th @ctober: Soviet delegate's speech].

Please telegraph full report of Soviet representative's speech.

0:0

Next Paper

E956

32538

E 0567

EXTRACT "THE TIMES."
Dated 14th. Oct., 1947.

SYRIAN TROOP MOVEMENTS

A BRITISH REMINDER

Mr. Dundas, the British Chargé d'Affaires in Syria, has had an informal talk with the Syrian Ministers of the Interior and of Defence in Damascus. The Syrian Prime Minister, Jamil Mardam, was away at Amman, where, together with other Arab Prime Ministers, he has been visiting King Abdullah of Transjordan.

Mr. Dundas took the opportunity of explaining the present British position in Palestine in the light of Mr. Creech Jones's statement to the United Nations to the effect that, in the absence of a settlement, the British Government must plan for the early withdrawal of the British forces and administration from Palestine. Mr. Dundas made it quite clear that the Palestine Government was still responsible for law and order in Palestine, and would remain so until withdrawal had been effected. On Thursday, it will be recalled, the council of the Arab League decided to ask Arab States to mobilize forces on the frontiers of Palestine, and on Friday the Syrian Minister of Defence announced publicly that units of the Damascus garrison were undertaking manoeuvres on a large scale along the Palestine border. Mr. Dundas naturally pointed out the deteriorating effect that these manoeuvres would have on the situation in Palestine.

These explanations should serve as a reminder, if any were needed, of the serious consequences of any move against either the territory or inhabitants of Palestine.

Confusion has also been caused by rumours spread in the Middle East to the effect that British troops had been withdrawn from northern Palestine and replaced by Transjordan troops. In fact, units of the King of Transjordan's Arab Legion were placed at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief in Palestine some time ago. The Transjordan Frontier Force, which normally operates in Palestine, is, of course, part of the British forces.

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| 1 2 3 4 5 6 | Reference: FO 371 61882

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411205

ONE TIME PAD

Recd, 11 Oct, 47.

D.T. 0.110845B Oct.

From: C. in C. MELF.

To: War Office.

MOST IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET GI/20268

Following decision of Arab League Council reliable report from

Damascus states all Syrian Aray leave stopped and Syrian Troops

concentrating Palestine Border. Agression considered unlikely before

UNO decision and moves if confirmed more likely measure of blackmail

to impress UNO and in particular USA with Arab determination.

Message Control,

Distribution by M.I.3a

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C.I.G.S.
V.C.I.G.S.
D.M.O.
D.D.M.O.(A).
D.D.M.O.(A).
D. Plans.
M.O.1,4.
D.M.I.
D.D.M.I.(I).
M.I.3,3a(2),11.
Foreign Office (Mr. Beith, Eastern Dept.)
Colonial Office (Lt.-Col. Chalmers).
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E 157V

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[EN CLAIR]

E 0568

GENERAL DISTRIBUTION

14 DET

FROM DAMASCUS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

No: 443

D. 5.51.p.m. 13th October 1947

15th October 1947

R. 9.30.p.m.13th October 1947

Mr. Kirkpatrick British Press Attaché in Damascus communicated to us yesterday the following news item. Mr. Dundas British Chargé d'Affaires in Damascus yesterday reminded the Syrian Government that the statement made by Mr. Creech Jones British Colonial Secretary over withdrawal of British forces and administration from Palestine depends upon certain conditions explained in the statement and until these terms are realised Britain will remain as she was before responsible for the defense of Palestine and for the maintenance of order and security in it.

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CYPHER/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

E 0577

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Evens. No. 742. D. 6.17. p.m. 13th October 1947.

13th October 1947.

R. 9.23. p.m. 13th October 1947.

Repeated to U.K. Del. New York,
Washington,
Cairo, B.M. E.O.
Jerusalem,
Bagdad, Saving.
Amman,
"
Jedda,
Damascus.

Palestine: Press reaction to statement of American policy.

Nationalist and Communist newspapers have reacted unfavourably to American support of partition and the United States has new become the main target of attack. French language newspapers have not yet fully commented one paper states America's decision was taken with an eye to the next elections. A Nationalist paper quotes Azzam Pasha as saying that America has become the nation most hated by the Arabs. Another Nationalist paper says the Arabs are determined to save Palestine by force whatever America's decision. Communist press gives prominence to Fares El Kheury's statement that America has yielded to Jewish pressure and expresses the belief that Arabs have a strong eard in the Middle East oil resources which, if properly used, should enable them to impose their wishes on pro-Zionist nations.

Foreign Office please pass to U.K. Del. New York and Washington as my telegrams No. 33 and 12 respectively.

[Repeated to U.K. Delegation New York and Washington.]

15 OCT

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Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2907

D. 11.22 a.m. 14th October, 1947 14th October, 1947. R. 5.40 p.m. 14th October, 1947

Repeated to Jerusalem Washington Saving

IMMEDIATE GIANT

My telegram No. 2905.

Palestine

- 1. The Soviet statement to the Palestine Committee while following the same general lines as the American differs from it in two respects.
- 2. The Soviet delegation clearly envisage the substitution of a new Administration, responsible to the United Nations, for the British Administration during the transition period.
- 3. On the question of frontiers the statement includes the following paragraph:

"It is necessary to note that the question of frontiers between the two States in the opinion of the Seviet delegation possibly because of lack of time could net be completely worked out by the special Committee as - the Committee's proposal for the partition of Palestine in a number of separate regions connected in certain points by way of narrow corridors cannot be considered a satisfactory selution of the question". This seems to hint at more sweeping fromtier changes than the United States delegation appear to have in mind.

Fereign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 93.

[Copies sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem]

FF



(Action completed.)	(Ind.y.)
Next	Paper.

E9605

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

43

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 2916 14th October, 1947. D. 9.09 p.m. 14th October, 1947

R. 4.10 a.m. 15th October, 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem and Saving to Washington.

90000

IMEDIATE GLANT

E 9595

My telegram No. 2905.

Palestine Committee.

15 OCT

At the thirteenth meeting on 14th October Ulloa (Peru) and Vieux (Haiti) declared the support of their governments for the U.N.S.C.O.P. Majority Plan, the former without using any new arguments for it and the latter after presenting various arguments against it. Ulloa expressed the wish that Jerusalem should remain permanently under a Christian authority.

- 2. Zeineddin (Syria) made a Long and passionate speech. After attacking the positions of the United States and Soviet delegations he asserted that the Charter would prevail in the Middle East because the Arabs were there to uphold it.
- 3. Simic (Yugoslavia) said that the British in withdrawing from Palestine would leave a difficult legacy behind then they had failed to develop self-government, spent too little on education and health services, and introduced no progressive social legislation. In these conditions it had been impossible for co-eperation to develop between Arabs and Jews. The Yugoslav Government upheld the proposals made by the U.N.S.C.O.P. minority. A federal state would not fully satisfy the aspirations of either people but its establishment would influence them in the direction of a mutual agreement on a realistic basis. It was futile for the Zionists to demand unlimited immigration. He moved a resolution however in favour of the immediate admission to Palestine of the Jewish refugees now existing "under intolerable conditions" in the "concentration camps" on Cyprus.
- 4. Ilsley, (Canada) announced the agreement of his government with U.N.S.C.O.P. s twelve general recommendations referring particularly to Nos. 1, 2 and 6 and their reluctant acceptance of the Majority Plan as a basis for discussion. It had been argued that there should be no partition without consent, but was it any better to maintain unity without consent? He supported an American resolution which has been tabled for the Constitution of a sub-committee to draw up detailed proposals for the future government of Palestine in accordance with the basic principles of the unanimous recommendations and the Majority Plan" of U.N.S.C.O.P. He called however for a second sub-committee including the permanent members of the Security Council, to consider the means of implementing these proposals. Referring to the proposed international volunteer force he said that its recruitment must be such as not further to inflame feeling. Fereign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my

[Copies sent to Telegraph Section, Colontal Office for transmission to Jerusalem].

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Next Paper.

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(Action completed.)

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

45

En clair

GENERAL DISTRIBUTION

FROM DAMASCUS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Dundas
No. 446
14th October, 1947

D. Untimed 15th October, 1947 R. 9.08 asm. 15th October, 1947

E 9805

Palestine.

Syrian Prime Minister's statement his Government's policy in Syrian Chamber on 13th October contained the following passage. "Our Government announces clearly and emphatically that they do not accept the partition of Palestine, nor do they accept that the Mandate should continue. The only solution they accept for Palestine is that it should be declared independent and an Arab nation be created therein".

2. Fereign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation as my telegram No. 2.

[Repeated to U.K. Delegation New York]

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278 E 9628 1947 16 OCT PALESTINE: M'Grokam. Committee for Political her fork

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(Action completed)

Next Paper

9612

32538



10, Bowning Street, Whitehall.

You will no doubt arrange for

such acknowledgment as is appropriate to be sent to the enclosed telegram which the Prime Minister has received from the World Committee for Palestine in New York.

Jum ern hum Julu-Hamin

J.P.E.C. Henniker, Esq., M.C., Foreign Office.

ANGLO-AMERICAN TELEGRAPH CO., LD.

909 NBN NEWYORK 90 1/47 10

NLT PRIME MINISTER ATTLEE 10 DOWNING STREET LONDON=

THE WORLD COMMITTEE FOR PALESTINE REPRESENTING NON JEWISH NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THIRTY COUNTRIES POSSESSING MEMBERSHIP IN UNITED NATIONS URGE THE SUPPORT BY HIS MAJESTYS GOVERNMENT FOR THE MAJORITY REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SPECTAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE STOP

Please send your Reply "Via WESTERN UNION" You may telephone us for a messenger

ESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY)

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CABLEGRAM

49

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CANADIAN NATIONAL TELEGRAPHS.

22 GREAT WINCHESTER STREET LONDON, E.C.2. (TEL. LONDON WALL 1234.)

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1947 OCT 11 AM 5 54

IT IS FURTHER URGED THAT THE INFLUENCE AND MEANS OF
YOUR GOVERNMENT BE USED FOR THE EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF A
SETTLEMENT BASED ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE UNSCOP MAJORITY
REPORT=

SIR ELLSWORTH FLAVELLE
CHAIRMAN 4TH FLOOR
201 EAST 57TH STREET NEW YORK CITY.

Please send your Reply "Via WESTERN UNION" You may telephone us for a messenge 4TH 201

61882

Registry No. E 9628/951/31. FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.
-2276, Oct 1947

Dear Chancery,

We enclose a copy of a telegram

Please send a suitable acknowledgment if you think fit.

Yours ever,

Eastern Department.

MB out. 16

RECORD OFFICE, LONDON 61882

Chancery washington.

FOREIGN OFFICE. S.W.1.

22nd October 1947.

(E 9628/951/31)

Dear Chancery,

We enclose a copy of a telegram addressed to The Prime Minister by The World Committee for Palestine of New York.

Please send a suitable acknowledgment if you think fit.

Yours ever,

Eastern Department.

The Chancery,
British Embassy,
Washington.

52

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

9633

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Cypher/OTP.

CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

9632

FROM DAMASCUS TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

16 OCT

Mr. Dundas. No. 445.

D. 7.32 a.m. 15th October 1947.

14th October 1947.

R. 9.5 a.m. 15th October 1947.

Repeated to: Jerusalem, U.K. Delegation, New York, and to

Cairo, Bagdad, Jedda,

Saving.

Amman,
Middle East Minister and
C.-in-C. Mediterranean.

CONFIDENTIAL.

My telegram No. 459.

Quneitra

American Military Attaché tells me that he has visited Quwatra[sic] area and estimates that there are already some 2,000 troops in the neighbourhood: frontier posts are being re-enforced and further troop movements are in progress.

Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation New York as my telegram No.1.

[Repeated to New York.]

W:W:W:W:W



THE PUBLIC

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

9636

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Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Bowker No. 2016 D. 8.05 p.m. 14th October 1947 R. 9.30 p.m. 14th October 1947

14th October 1947.
Repeated to Jerusalem

Bagdad Beirut Damascus Jedda Amman

Saving.

E 9633

16 OCT

CONFIDENTIAL

Palestine.

Asked about press reports and particularly statement attributed to Azzam by Reuters, to the effect that Egyptian troops were moving towards Palestine frontier, Chief of British Military Mission denied all knowledge of any such movements and said he had not observed any sign thereof. He agrees [gp.undec.] should any substantial movement in that direction take place it must inevitably be observed by our military authorities in the Canal Zone.

PALESTINE

E 9636

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Soldier Committee Aboling Low Kinth.

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(Minutes.)

Mr. Benis Oct-16

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En Clair

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2928
D. 8.00 p.m. 15th October, 1947
I5th October, 1947
Repeated to Jerusalem and Saving to Washington

IMMEDIATE GIANT.

My telegram No. 2916.

E 9636

, 16 OCT

Palestine Committee.

dangerous precedent.

At the 14th meeting on the 15th October the Arab case was restated by Chamoun (Lebanon) and a spokesman for Seif El-Islam Abdullah (Yemen). Chamoun made effective use of a series of official American statements on the subject of self-determination from 1918 onwards. He also drew the Committee's attention to the figures of population in the two extremities of the opposed Jewish state. In Eastern Galilee there were eighty six thousand Arabs and twentynine thousand Jews, in the Negeb one hundred and two thousand Arabs and one thousand Jews. He warned the Committee that

Foreign Office please pass immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No.95.

[Copies sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

to concede national independence to a minority would be a

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Reference: 61882

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PALESTINE Ouch kinger down to aboling Comment. writing account of matery of regist of lack degree of brack guil & date. de Horis of May (Autok. right continuiting the Contracted The in genting Alter. Repealed to Washington King Abdullah asles for quidance from Du Palestine question he will do his best I to discourage provocative demonstrations on the borders of Palestine during the cuitical feriod! U withdrawal?

E 9639

the difficult tiring is to find formering helpful to some time hung Abdullah. We myst romerate him that we are loveing vegently into the problems affecting

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Affecting Transjoidan which will are a curise with our with drawal from Palestine.

Mrs. Beins art. 16

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Re Secretary of Shite

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at X.

25/10.

111

Pecretary of State. fl. see the S. &S' minute on Amman Et. 306 attached. We sent Amman a certain amount of guidance in our desp. in E8993/42/65, which crossed Amman's previous regnest for guidance in the tel. in E9240/4. We have now sent farther guidence in our tol. & New York No 3318 of the tel. to Arab Sonti. 1 think we can however send tomething more now, in view of our treaty obligation is consult with Habellah. l'attach a draft.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

CYPHER/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir A. Kirkbride.

D: 3.17 p.m. 14th October, 1947.

No. 306.

14th October, 1947.

R: 6.25 p.m. 14th October, 1947.

Repeated to: U.K.Delegation New York,

Bagdad, Cairo,

Damascus,

Beirut (Please pass to Damascus as my telegram

No. 79),

Jedda, B.M.E.O. Cairo,

Jerusalem Saving.

79), the should study this hand your strong.

This morning King Abdullah gave me following information about visit of members of the Council of Arab League to Amman yesterday. He was extremely annoyed with Jamil Mardam who promised to come and dropped out at the last moment. Syria being represented by Lutfi Hafar. Jamil Mardam's ection appears to have been discourteous and was hardly calculated to assist me in my endeavour to control the king on the subject of Greater Syrian project.

- The King gave a short speech of welcome, text of which is contained in my immediately following telegram. He claims that speech was well received and that Azzam and Riad el Solh expressed agreement with the policy which it implied. Azzam remarked publicly that King Abdullah was not to be blaned for advocating United Syria as union of all Arab countries was the ultimate aim of all members of the League. The King in reply welcomed the opportunity of making it clear that anything that he had done in the matter of Arab unity had been entirely unselfish and in the interest of Arab nation as a whole.
- Saleh Jabr got the King aside and said that he proposed to form a mobile force of Iraq army and to send it to Transjordan immediately so that it would be ready to intervene in Palestine as soon as the need arose. This suggestion was most unwelcome to the King who replied saying he had an army of his own which was quite capable of safeguarding the interests of Transjordan and that he would not agree to the admission of an Iraq detachment at present. The King asked me if I thought he had done the right thing in this connexion and I replied that he had acted most wisely.
- Yusef Yassin does not seem to have contributed much on the subject of Palestine but did suggest to the King that it was important at the moment for no internal rivalries to weaken Arab states. The King spoke appreciatively of endeavour of

61882

/T.sbanese

Lebanese Ministers to secure better relations between Transjordan and Syria and to avoid any harmful decision on the subject of Palestine.

5. In conclusion the King asked me if His Majesty's Government could give him any guidance in the line he should follow regarding Palestine in existing difficult circumstances. He seems in a more reasonable state of mind now and it would assist me if some message could be sent to him in this connexion.

Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation New York, Bagdad, Cairo, Jedda, B.M.E.O. Cairo, as my telegrams Nos. 6, 55, 92, 54 and 43 respectively.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York, Bagdad, Cairo, Jedda, B.M.E.O. Cairo.]

MM

1111111 "ejerence: FO 371 61882

William Hile.

Pal

AMENDED DISTRIBUTION (7TH OCTOBER, 1947)

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

E /G Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK
(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3318 3rd October, 1947 D. 2.35 a.m. 4th October, 1947

Repeated to Washington No.10161; Cairo No. 1846;
Bagdad No.839; Jedda No.398; Amman No.433;
Beirut No.614; Damascus No.511.

IMPORTANT

DEDIP

SECRET

Following for Colonial Secretary and Minister of State from the Secretary of State.

The Prime Minister and I have been considering the reactions to date to our statement on Palestine of September 26th. It strikes us that both the Arabs and the Jews, and possibly also the United States, are treating with some amount of scepticism our announcement that we would withdraw both arms and administration from Palestine in the absence of a settlement. We do not want publicly to confront the United States with a deadline by making any further public pronouncement at the moment, but we suggest that you should take any opportunity in conversations with Americans and Representatives of Jews and Arabs to make it clear that they must be in no doubt of our determined intention to carry out the policy contained in your statement of September 26th. Neither can they assume that the delay can be very long before we withdraw after it has become plain that a settlement is impossible.

- 2. We think it important that those concerned should realise that there is increasing restiveness on the part of His Majesty's Government and the public generally at our very difficult situation. Illegal immigration is still being encouraged. If Palestine were British territory we should be able to deal with the situation. As things are, we are bound by the provisions of the Mandate which we have loyally attempted to carry out.
- 3. Silver's statement as reported in today's press makes it all the more important that the Jews and the Americans should be brought to understand the true position. I am anxious that Marshall personally shall know where we stand. I am also instructing His Majesty's Representatives with the Arab Governments (see my telegram repeated to you as my immediately following telegram) to bring the position home to them.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

SECRET Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO HIS MAJESTY'S REPRESENTATIVE.

CAIRO No. 1925 BAGDAD No. 883 BEIRUT No. 640 DAMASCUS No. 526

KARACHI (via C.R.O.) JEDDA No. 422

AMAIN No. 454 BRITISH MIDDLE E.ST OFFICE CAIRO NO.772

16th October, 1947 D. 7.30 a.m. 17th October, 1947

Repeated to Washington No. 10668,

Moscow No. 3182 United Kingdom Delegation New York No. 3520 Jerusalem

IMPORT NT SECRET

It may be useful to you to have an interim appreciation of the way the Palestine situation is developing and guidance for your contacts with the Government to which you are accredited and the press.

- 2. We are in general fairly satisfied with the effect of our undertaking to withdraw. This has allowed us at last to give up the uneviable position of protagonist and it has brought the Arabs and Jews and other Governments nearer to facing realities. Our immediate object must now be to drive home the point we have made by convincing all concerned that we really intend to withdraw in the absence of a settlement accepted by both Jews and Arabs or should the Assembly fail to reach any settlement at all during its present session. If it is clear that we are not going to be responsible for enforcing an unpopular settlement and that the difficulties of doing so will be extremely great, there is more chance of a compromise involving concessions by both sides and of sensible consideration of the question in New York.
- 3. The best result from our point of view would naturally be that the Arabs and Jews should agree and should ask us to remain in Palestine for a limited transitional period to help them put the agreement into effect. While American and Russian support for partitition makes it unfortunately less likely that the Jews will make any concessions, we should carefully watch for any sign of compromise on either side. It is perhaps permissible to detect a slight move in this direction in speech of Pakistan delegate at United Nations on October 13th, in the course of which, while reiterating his opposition to partition, he said that if this solution were agreed upon, boundaries should be so drawn as to include roughly the same number of rabs in the Jewish State as Jews in the Arab State.
- 4. We may at some stage have the opportunity of using our good offices to bring Arabs and Jews together, but the moment for this has not yet come, and we must be extremely careful not to become prematurely associated with any

compromise

THE PUBLIC

(2)

compromise proposal.

5. It does not seem desirable to react very strongly to threats of direct action by Arab States. There seems in all their talk to be a good deal of whistling to keep their courage up. The most important thing from our point of view is that they should not attempt any direct intervention in Palestine while we are still in charge there and you should, if you think it desirable, recall to the Government to which you are accredited that we are of course continuing to be responsible for the administration of Palestine until further notice and that meanwhile any action prejudicial to the authority of the Administration there will in fact be directed at us. You should also, if you think it desirable, deny rumours that we have any secret arrangements with any Arab Government about action by Arab forces in Palestine after our withdrawal.

u u u u u

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CYPHER/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir A. Kirkbride.

D: 3.17 p.m. 14th October, 1947.

14th October, 1947.

R: 6.25 p.m. 14th October, 1947.

Repeated to: U.K.Delegation New York,

Bagdad, Cairo, Damascus,

Beirut (Please pass to Damascus as my telegram

Jedda,

R M F O Code

B.M.E.O. Caire, Jerusalem Saving. E 9639

/Lebance

SECRET

This morning King Abdullah gave me following information about visit of members of the Council of Arab League to Amman yesterday. He was extremely annoyed with Jamil Mardam who promised to come and dropped out at the last moment, Syria being represented by Lutfi Hafar. Jamil Mardam's action appears to have been discourteous and was hardly calculated to assist me in my endeavour to control the King on the subject of Greater Syrian project.

- 2. The King gave a short speech of welcome, text of which is contained in my immediately following telegram. He claims that speech was well received and that Azzam and Riad el Solh expressed agreement with the policy which it implied. Azzam remarked publicly that King Abdullah was not to be blamed for advocating United Syria as union of all Arab countries was the ultimate aim of all members of the League. The King in reply welcomed the opportunity of making it clear that anything that he had done in the matter of Arab unity had been entirely unselfish and in the interest of Arab nation as a whole.
- 3. Saleh Jabr got the King aside and said that he proposed to form a mobile force of Iraq army and to send it to Transjordan immediately so that it would be ready to intervene in Palestine as soon as the need arcse. This suggestion was most unwelcome to the King who replied saying he had an army of his own which was quite capable of safeguarding the interests of Transjordan and that he would not agree to the admission of an Iraq detachment at present. The King asked me if I thought he had done the right thing in this connexion and I replied that he had acted most wisely.
- 4. Yusef Yassin does not seem to have contributed much oner the subject of Palestine but did suggest to the King that it was important at the moment for no internal rivalries to weaken. Arab states. The King spoke appreciatively of endeavour of

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| 1 2 3 4 5 6 | Reference: FO 371 61882

Lebanese ministers to secure better relations between Transjordan and Syria and to avoid any harmful decision on the subject of Palestine.

5. In conclusion the King asked me if His Majesty's Government could give him any guidance in the line he should follow regarding Palestine in existing difficult circumstances. He seems in a more reasonable state of mind now and it would assist me if some message could be sent to him in this connexion.

Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation New York, Bagdad, Cairo, Jedda, B.M.E.O.Cairo as my telegrams Nos. 6, 55, 92, 54 and 43 respectively.

[Repeated to U.K.Delegation New York, Bagdad, Caire, Jedda, B.M.E.O.Caire].

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B. A. B. B.

Draft. H.M. Minister, Amman

Telegram.

U.K. Delegation, New York.

W.O. (M.O.4) C 0 00T 1957 L... TO DATE.

October

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F. O.,

M.

CONFIDENTIAL

Your telegram No. 306 [of October 14th: Transjordan and Palestine].

I have been considering what further whom lin action and guidance can be given to King Abdullah beyond that contained in my despatch No. 167 of October 2nd. You will no doubt have spoken to him on the general lines of my telegram No. 3318 to New York and my telegram No. 454 to Caire, though I realise that the former telegram, in emphasising our determination to leave Palestine, is not calculated to reassure King Abdullah.

2. You should now, if you think it desirable, speak to King Abdullah generally on the following lines. H.M.G. fully recognise King Abdullah's natural anxiety about the effect of developments in Palestine on Transjordan and they recognise also their obligation to consult with him, so far as may be possible, about their Palestine policy. They have made it quite clear to everyone concerned that they are in any case determined to give up the mandate and withdraw from Palestine. They believe that the independence of Palestine will best meet the wishes of all the inhabitants and of neighbouring States and They earnestly hope that the knowledge of the imminent British withdrawal may bring

the/

the two parties together and make possible the establishment of an agreed settlement without bloodshed. .. H. M. G. are carefully refraining from pronouncing on the merits of different solutions which have been put forward, since their own efforts to find a solution have always been rejected in the past and since they do not wish to give any opportunity for the suggestion that they are still acting from interested Their advice to the Arabs of Palestine motives. and to the Governments of neighbouring States is that they should frankly face up to the consequences of British withdrawal and should decide whether they would prefer that we should hand over to some constitutional authority set up with the agreement of all parties, or whether we should leave a vacuum in which thousands of people on either side would undoubtedly be sacrificed in civil war.

3. For your own confidential information, we are considerably preoccupied with the question of possible participation by the Arab Legion in Palestine after our withdrawal. Our present tentative idea is that it would be necessary, on our ceasing to be responsible for the administration of Palestine, to secure the withdrawal of all Arab Legion units from Palestine to Transjordan and to cease paying the expenses of these units. If at a later stage King Abdullah were to try to send units of the Legion back into Palestine, we should probably have to withdraw those British officers who are seconded to the service of the Transjordan Government and we should also/

also have to consider to what extent we could continue payment of the subsidy provided for in Article 8 of the Annex to the Treaty. Our present feeling is that we should wish to warn King Abdullah in advance that this would have to be our attitude. Please telegraph your observations.

[Cano only] Please for & B.M.E.O. as my fel. No. 793

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

E 9639/951/31 Confidential Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO AMMAN

No. 470

D. 1.00 p.m. 26th October 1947

25th October 1947

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York No.3660

Bagdad No. 926
Cairo No. 1985
Damascus No. 548
Beirut No. 664
Jedda No. 441
British Middle East Office Cairo No. 793
Jerusalem

CONFIDENTIAL

Your telegram No. 306 [of October 14th: Transjordan and Palestine].

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1 2 3 4 5 6 Reference: FO 371 61882

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[Cairo only] Please pass to British Middle East Office as my telegram No. 793.

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PALESTINE

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and League bound Heiling Comman. Registry Number Refer Comman til 506/E 9639/951/311 Let O. Herkbride No. annan. Dated Received in Registry Reputed to Washington Last Paper. 963 9 Please see E 9639 References. (Print.)

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(Action completed.) Next Paper.

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and shouldbe retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir A. Kirkbride.

D. 11.20.a.m. October 15th, 1947.

No. 308.

October 15th, 1947.

R. 1.46. p.m. October 15th, 1947.

Repeated to U.K.Delegation New York.

Bagdad, Cairo.

Damascus,

Beirut, (Please pass to Damascus as my

telegram No. 81),

Jedda.

B.M.E.O. Cairo. Jerusalem, Saving.

E 9640

SECRET.

My telegram No. 306.

16 OCT

Samir Pasha's version of visit of members of the Council did not vary materially from the King's except that the King's anger over Jamil Mardam was evident throughout the occasion and did much to mar cordial exchanges. The King is insisting that Samir should send telegram of protest to Jamil.

Foreign Office please pass to U.K.Delegation New York, Bagdad, Caire, Jedda, British Middle East Office as my telegrams Nos. 8, 57, 94, 56 and 45 respectively.

> [Repeated to New York Delegation, Bagdad, Caire, Jedda and British Middle East Office.]

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Next Paper.

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PALESTINE

16 OCT

Politic Committee Hertigs Mars #10.01 3412 Treatmit took of Ruman Hotement as priviled in the pull.

This is a surprisingly sensible speech.

(JE CABLE)

to be acceptable to the Lews - without being underly partis au. Never theless is unst Seriously among the Arabs.

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Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 2,929.

D: 10.11 p.m. 15th October, 1947.

15th October, 1947.

R: 6.40 a.m. 16th October, 1947.

Repeated to: Washington Saving.

IMMEDIATE GIANT E 9642

Palestine.
Your telegram No. 3,472.

16 OCT

Following is text of Russian statement as printed in the press:

[Begins]

Three questions are on the agenda of our committee:

The question of Palestine in connexion with the letter of the representative of Great Britain of April 2nd 1947 to the Secretary General of the United Nations the report of the special committee on the Palestine question and the proposal to terminate the mandate for Palestine and recognise Palestine as an independent state.

The special session of the Assembly called at the request of the Government of Great Britain adopted on May 15th 1947 a resolution on the establishment of a special committee to investigate all questions and problems connected with the problem of Palestine and for the preparation of a report to the General Assembly as well as of proposals in relation to the possible ways for the solution of the Palestine problem.

The representative of the Arab Higher Committee and the representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine have already made statements before us on the Palestine question. The statements of these representatives and of several delegates were full of historical references parallels. juridical arguments etc. Naturally historical investigations references and parallels can play a certain and in seme cases a quite important part in helping to find the right appreach for the solution of this or the other problem. The historical and legal argumentation of the Arab and the Jewish representative heard by us centains a number of arguments which could be used to defend the Arab point of view as well as in defence of the Jewish point of view. Arguments "not decisive" but naturally these historical and legal arguments cannot and should not be decisive in this matter - they can only play a subsidiary part. The fact is that we have here net an academic dispute in respect of how long the Jews ext the Arabs have lived in Palestine er in respect of the

/questient

question which of these peoples and during what period occupied a dominating position in this country. The substance of the question is contained in something else. We are speaking here of the right of selfdetermination of many hundreds of thousands of Jews as well as Arabs living in Palestine the right of the Arabs as well as of the Jews of Palestine to live freely and peacefully in their own state.

We should not forget here that during the last war the Jewish people suffered exceptional calamities and sufferings. In territories dominated by Hitler the Jews, as is known, underwent nearly complete physical extermination. Nearly half of the Jewish pepulation of Europe was exterminated. Enormous numbers of the Jews of Europe were deprived of their fatherland, of shelter and of means of subsistence. It is necessary to take care of the necessities of a people which has suffered such terture. At the same time it is necessary to point out that no state in Western Europe was able to give the necessary aid to the Jewish people in the defence of its rights and of its existence against the oppression on the part of the Hitlerites and their allies.

All this explains why the Jews strive to create their own state and it would be unjust to deny the Jewish people the right to fulfil this desire. The question of the creation of a Jewish state is a wholly mature and urgent problem. One cannot avoid the solution of this problem no matter what efforts are made to complicate it and to drown it in a sea of references to historical events going back to the depth of the ages and even of Millenniums.

Jewish rights stressed. Taking into account all that has been said above it is necessary to stress particularly that the Jewish people as other peoples as well have the right that its fate its security and welfare would not be dependent from the mercy and goodwill of this or the other state. And we can help in this the Jewish people acting in accordance with the principles of the charter of the United Nations Organisation which provides the insuring of the right of every people to self-determination and independence.

If we clear the question before us of all the superstructure of a historical and formally legal character stressed here by a number of speakers and approach the consideration of this question on a broad political basis then the Soviet delegation is convinced that the Palestine problem will be solved.

As is known the reason for the Palestine question being before the General Assembly consists in the fact that the mandatory system of Government in Palestine established in 1922 did not meet the test. According to the statement of the British Government itself, the mandate for Palestine has proven to be impossible in practice. It is therefore quite clear that the complications in the relations between Arabs and Jews and those bloody events which have led to the necessity to bring the Palestine question for consideration before the organisation of the United Nations were a result of this lack of success of the Mandatory

/Government.

Government. Without dwelling in more details on the events in Palestine about which sufficient has been said here I will now turn to the report submitted by the special committee. Two plans praised.

The Soviet delegation notes with satisfaction that both alternatives for a solution of the Palestine problem which are submitted by the majority of the special committee and by its minority are in accordance with the proposals stated by the Soviet delegation at the Special Assembly session. It is necessary to note that the committee has done useful and great work the results of which will help us here to find the best solution for the Palestine problem.

The Soviet delegation agrees with those recommendations which have been unanimously adopted by the Special Committee. The most important of these recommendations are contained in the first and second paragraphs where the report says that the Palestine mandate should be terminated as soon as possible and that Palestine should be given independence in the shortest time possible.

In respect of the recommendations contained in chapters VI and VII of the report in which are formulated the observations and proposals for the future régime in Palestine, the Soviet delegation considers it necessary to state the following:

The report of the Special Committee contains two recommendations (1) a recommendation adopted by the majority proposing the partition of Palestine into two independent states one Arab and one Jewish and (2) the recommendation of the minority in which it is proposed to create in Palestine a single Arab-Jewish state on a federative basis. Naturally the plan proposed by the minority of the Special Committee has its advantages and qualities in smuch as it is based on the idea of the creation in Palestine of a single Arab-Jewish state.

Turns down minority plan. However, under the present circumstances when the relations between Arabs and Jews already wersened before have reached such a degree of tension that a conciliation of their points of view on the question how the Palestine problem should be solved has become impossible, the proposal of the minority cannot apparently be put into practice. Because of this we have to turn to the plan proposed by the majority of the committee, that is, the plan which provides the partition of Palestine into two independent states one Arab and one Jewish as this plan is under the present circumstances the one which could be better put into practice.

I would like to say here a few words about the economic unity of Palestine. The recommendations on the Palestine Economic Union deserve attention in the view of the Soviet Delegation. We consider that the economic unity of Palestine would not only correspond to the interests of Palestine economy as a whole but would also be a means of bringing the peoples inhabiting Palestine together, and by this will be able to prepare in the future more close political relations between them. Without going at present into the details for the

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OFFICE,

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realisation of the economic unity of Palestine the Soviet Delegation welcomes the putting of this question and considers that it is in this direction that the most satisfactory solution can be found.

Exceptions noted.

Supporting in principle the recommendations submitted by the majority of the Special Committee it is necessary, however, to point out that they contain a number of proposals and evaluations which cannot be accepted by us without a thorough analysis and without introducing corresponding amendments. Such serious questions as the question of the frontier line between the two states or the measures during the transition period after the termination of the British-Palestine mandate, as well as of the status of the city of Jerusalem and a number of other more or less important questions on which I do not consider it necessary to dwell at present, call for further and therough consideration.

It is necessary to note that the question of frontiers between the two states, in the opinion of the Soviet delegation, possibly because of lack of time could not be completely worked out by the Special Committee as the committees proposal for the partition of Palestine in a number of separate regions connected in certain points by way of narrow corridors cannot be considered a satisfactory solution of the question.

The Soviet delegation considers that further work on a concrete plan for the delimitation of frontiers and on national separation of Palestine should be undertaken by the Special Committee so as to eliminate as far as possible the existing defects.

Points to transition period.

If the Assembly adopts a decision for the partition of Palestine into two states, a number of complicated questions will arise connected with the termination of the British mandate in Palestine as well as with the plan for the partition of Palestine itself.

The question will arise in the first place on what basis shall the Government of Palestine be built up during the transition period.

Everybody realises that the transition period from the present state of mandatory Government in Palestine to the beginning of the existence of two independent states has enormous importance from the point of view of the future fate of both these states. Therefore the Soviet delegation considers that simultaneously with the termination of the mandate it is necessary to take a decision on the authority which will govern during the transition period and be responsible to the

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- 5 -

organisation of the United Nations and to work out in connexion with this the necessary measures.

If at this session the General Assembly will decide on the question of the creation of an Arab and a Jewish state this will be a great step forward in the solution of the whole Palestine question.

These are the general statements of principle which the Soviet delegation considers necessary to make at present, reserving naturally for itself the right to speak in the future on separate concrete questions.

[Ends]

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CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir A Kirkbride D. 2. 30 p.m. 14th October, 1947.

No. 307

14th October, 1947. R. 7. 10 p.m. 14th October, 1947.

Repeated to U.K. Del. New York

Bagdad

Beirut

Cairo

Damascus

Jedda

Cairo B.M.E.O. 16 OCT

Jerusalem Saving

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is text of speech.

[Begins]

"As a [gp undec] brother in a real Arab country I welcome the Arab League. I welcome the League at a critical moment and in a time full of doubts. The Arabs usually unite and co-operate when grave events appear on the horizon. The present meeting of the Arab League Council is unique in its importance. Ever since it was made the Arabs have rejected the Balfour Declaration which has brought upon the British, Arabs and Jews all these troublesome difficulties and has led to the present consequence and we are a nation which defends its homeland and sacred property and at the same time respects the rights and property of others. But, we are a nation which has lived in this dear country and has clung to it tooth and nail from the time it was conquered by our forefathers up to this day. This country has remained Arab through the times of the Caliphate the Crusades and the Ottamens up the present. We do not want aggreession because God dislikes aggressors, we prefer peace to contraversy. The case is now in your hands and in the hands of those. who represent you at the United Nations Assembly. Thereafter, when the time comes for serious thinking and when grave happenings appear on the horizon, if we say we yearn eagerly for the safety of our country, we shall be saying the truth, and if we say we will not fail to defend. we shall not be lying, and if others shall lean towards peace, we shall lean too, relying on providence. Peace comes before controversy and nothing can defeat good intentions. The treasuries of the Arab nation and the hospitality of the Arab Governments will make good the loss incurred by any complainant. Once defence is resorted to, we shall have power to carry it through with

/the grace



the grace of God. Again I welcome the Arab League and again I confirm that both we and the Arab League prefer peace provided that Palestine shall remain an integral Arab country."

[Ends].

Foreign Office please pass to U.K.Del. New York as my telegram No. 7.

[Repeated to U.K. Del.New York]

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Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Evans,

D: 1.2 p.m. 15th October, 1947

No. 750 15th October, 1947.

R: 2.45 p.m. 15th October, 1947

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York. Washington.

Jerusalem
Cairo
British Middle East Office
Bagdad Saving
Jedda Saving
Damascus Saving.

E 9648

16 OCT

Secret.

Palestine; reaction to statement of American policy.

United States Minister on October 14th read out to me text of a telegram which he had sent to the State Department following a meeting with the Lebanese Prime Minister on the previous day. Following is gist of telegram: "Prime Minister assured the United States Minister of the Lebanon's friendship with the United States. He did not, however, conceal the fact that statement of American policy on Palestine had been badly received but he was glad that United States Government did not appear to be urging other Governments to follow the same line. 'As regards the Palestine situation generally, the Prime Minister said that in his opinion it was essential if the British withdrew to "fill the vacuum". He personally would prefer an American force but if that was impossible an international body would be acceptable. His Excellency stressed that military measures decided on by the Arab League were merely precautionary and that in any case it had been agreed that no action would be taken until the British had evacuated Palestine. He also assured the United States Minister that there had been no tendency among Arab leaders to turn to the Russians. In fact he had taken Nokrashy Pasha to task for flirting with the U.S.S.R in connexion with Angle-Egyptian dispute".

2. United States Minister told me that on October 12th he and visiting Congress party had discussed the statement with Lebanese Prime Minister /and

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and admitted that they had found him much more hostile. They had taken the line that the American statement might have been worse; United States Government were in favour of UNSCOP's majority recommendations but had also emphasised that any solution had to be workable; if the Arab's Governments were able to produce good arguments showing that majority recommendations were not workable, they were sure that the United Kingdom Government would take them into account. United States Minister said he did not think Riad Bey had been much impressed but he hoped nevertheless that in view of official and personal assurances which Riad Bey had given him (see my telegram No.694) reaction in the Lebanon would not take a violent form.

3. Generally speaking, Lebanese Christians (who, from the President downward have been considerably uneasy since the President downward have take military precautions) have the cated much less strongly than have the Roslens.

The impression created by the statement among Arab designates to the Arab League meeting appears to be very unfavourable and there is a general air of depression.

Azzam Pasha told me on October 14th that in his spinion the stand taken by the United States Government destroyed any possibility of an agreement between the Jews and the Arabs - he had hoped that following the strong measures adopted by the Arab League the Jews might have been prepared to come to terms, but now that they were backed by the Americans this was virtually precluded. Saleh Jabr had earlier described to me the development as "bad news" and added that it might result in complications.

Foreign Office please pass to United Hingdom Delegation New York and Washington as my telegrams Nos. 34 and 13 respectively.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York and Washington].

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Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

Next Paper.

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

D. 6.10 p.m. 15th October, 1947 Mr. Evans No. 753 15th October, 1947 15th October, 1947 R. 7.33 p.m. 15th October, 1947 Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York, Washington, British Middle East Office Cairo, Jerusalem, E 9665 Bagdad, Saving Amman,

Jedda, Damascus,) Cairo

OCT

My telegram No. 742. Palestine-Press reaction to statements on Russian and American policy.

General reaction may be described as one of bitter disappointment to the Arabs. American's attitude had been more or less anticipated but that of Russia has been a surprise. It is noteworthy that attitude of Russia and America has turned the scales in favour of Britain except in very few papers which still hold Britain as well as America, responsible for abnormal situation in Palestine. Of these "Ash Sharq" traces whole question to the Balfour declaration and calls Arab States to [gp. undec. ? cancel] all oil concessions already given to either Britain or "An-Nidal" fecuses its attack on America alone America. and urges Ibn Saud to repeal oil concessions. "Beirut" under headline "Bolshevism is no better than American capitalism" contrasts open anti-Arab attitude to America and latest pre-Arab attitude of Britain implied in Colonial Secretary's statement. Mufti's statement to correspondent of Daily Mail describing British Government decision to evacuate Palestine as wise is prominently reported in several papers. Seme papers report that Iraqi Government has informed American Minister in Bagdad that visit to Iraq of American Congress Committee was undesirable

Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation New York and Washington as my telegrams Nos. 13 and 46 respectively and Cairo to British Middle East Office as my telegram No. 192.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York and Washington].

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OCT 194

1947

Dated

Receivedin Registry

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(Minutes.)

Last Paper.

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References.

Mr. Berne out. 17

(Print.)

20 Oct. 14.0.4

Next Paper

I venture to think that this speech would have been even better if it had stopped about the end The two passages I have marked at the bottom of page 6 seem rather to weaken the general effect. The first of these passages would suggest to those who wished to understand it this way, e.g. particularly the Americans, that we would, when it came to the point, not be willing to face the prospect of leaving a vacuum, whereas it should, in fact, be an important part of our attitude that we were willing to do this. are not thought to be genuinely ready to do so, much of the possible effect of our withdrawal in bringing the parties together would be lost.

The second marked passage on page 6 suggests that in certain circumstances we would be advising the Arabs and Jews to accept a settlement of which we should ourselves disapprove to the point of being unwilling to participate in implementing it. This is a proper democratic attitude of bowing to the will of the majority, but it may be a little difficult to put across in the Middle East without We should of course hope appearing hypocritical. that, when it came to the point, Arabs and Jews would acquiesce in any settlement which the United Nations try to impose, in order that there might not be unnecessary bloodshed and disorder. for the present our more important objective is to see that a comparatively acceptable settlement is put forward rather than that the parties in the end accept any settlement on which the majority may agree.

I doubt if it is necessary to call attention to these points in reply to the telegram.

17th October, 1947.

NOA \

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4667

PALESTINE

Now please see Sir O. Sargent's minute on the attached copy of New York telegram No. 2984; also Foreign Office telegram to New York No. 3553, of which a copy is attached, containing the Secretary of

State's congratulations to the Colonial Secretary on his statement. The basis for the view of the Jewish spokesmen that Mr. Creech Jones' second speech has left open a door closed by the first speech may rest on the two passages to which I have called attention in my minute above, also on the sentence in the first paragraph on page 6 of the telegram within: "Our "resources can be used to assist in arriving at an "equitable and just plan".

I think it would be best to ask Mr. Creech Jones on what passages of his statement the Jewish spokesmen rely for their view, as given in New York telegram No. 2984, and to suggest that he should take all necessary steps to ensure that this misinterpretation does not persist.

I attach a draft.

BASI Immor

20th October, 1947.

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His a great pilig the the Creech Jones did hot use the campile chosen phrase thick in tech chosen phrase thick in tech his in on tel ho. 3468 § 2,

> Seen in DeW Nagy

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WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 2938

D: 3.52 p.m. 16th October, 1947.

16th October, 1947.

R: 11.05 p.m. 16th October, 1947.

Repeated to: Jerusalem,

Washington.

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Palestine.

The Colonial Secretary will speak second at the meeting of the Palestine Committee beginning at 3 p.m. New York time to-day. Following is text:

[Begins]

Before the general discussion concludes and the committee examines suggestions which have emerged for resolving the Palestine problem I desire to make some observations though in some respects it will be necessary for me to reiterate some of the points in my earlier statement.

It was to be expected that in the public discussion of the problem which Palestine presents certain harsh and inaccurate statements should be made regarding the policy of the mandatory Government and the work of the British authority in Palestine. We do not complain of fair and disinterested criticism. It has been easy enough for those without responsibility - for those with their own interests to promote - to traduce my Government. But my silence must not be interpreted to mean that I endorse inaccuracies and prejudices and that there is no answer to the criticisms - rather, it should be understood that whatever the temptation to me to reply, my delegation feel that in the present circumstances no purpose is served by recriminatory talk when the Palestine problem is so difficult and grave as it is. It demands from all of us understanding, and as little prejudice as possible.

His Majesty's Government is new surrendering the mandate ever Palestine with, I note, general approval. The United Kingdom set out 30 years ago to establish a national home for the Jewish people and undertook to do nothing which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine. It undertook, with international endersement, to facilitate Jewish immigration under softable conditions and to encourage close settlement by Jewa another and while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections

of the population are not prejudiced. It has proved a thankless, and ultimately an impracticable, responsibility for, in the nature of things, neither Jews nor Arabs have been satisfied that their rights and claims have been fully acknowledged by the mandatory - neither have felt able to assume genuine responsibility in Government or administration and neither have been prepared to acknowledge differences and find some mutual accommodation. In the circumstances, the mandate has proved self-contradictory and to a great extent unworkable. Nevertheless the national home has been established, a Jewish community of over 6,000,000 has been built up, the Arab population has doubled, social standards have improved and economic activities have increased to the advantage of everyone. The services of the modern state have been created. This is not only our judgment of the situation but is confirmed by the report of the United Nations Special Committee from which I quote the following extracts:

"The present difficult circumstances should not distort the perspective of solid achievement arising from the joint efforts of the Jewish community and the administration in laying the foundations of the national home."

(Paragraph 93 on page 23).

"One may find in the record of the Palestine administration evidence of persistent effort to effect gradual improvements in the economic and social condition of the Arab population".

(Paragraph 97 on page 24).

Britain which has played some part in saving liberty against tyranny in two world wars, which contributed something to the making of the new Arab nations, which has given shelter in the United Kingdom since the end of the war to over 300,000 individuals who would otherwise have been in the displaced persons camps on the Continent and has found homes since 1933 for some 70,000 Jewish refugees, and which by its struggle in war and its administration helped to make the national home possible, will be judged before the bar of history in due course. I want only to say that in spite of the revolts and the terrorism, Palestine has built up its services and still enjoys economic presperity - the machinery of administration has worked - a great tribute to the Palestine authorities and the Government servants who under great strain and risk have been employed there. Our efforts to find accommodation between the communities in Palestine have failed. This cannot be attributed to the various terms of the White Paper of 1939 which in a number of major respects have not been implemented - indeed immigration has continued well beyond the 75,000 contemplated and constitutional changes, for reasons outside the mandatory's control, have not been made. In the absence of full co-operation or of any positive contribution from other powers and in view of the sheer hepelessness of the mandatory obtaining a settlement and

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reconciliation of conflicts within the mandate, the United Kingdom Government asked the United Nations to consider the future Government of Palestine. The United Nations Special Committee have submitted suggestions and we have made known our agreement with its twelve general recommendations. We have repeated our views that the mandate should be laid down because it is unworkable and that the obligations to the two communities are irreconcilable and that Palestine should now move to independence. We made these decisions known without delay in order to facilitate the work of the Assembly.

In our discussions with the two communities in recent years we have evolved a number of proposals within the terms of the mandate but experience finally convinced the United Kingdom Government that an impartial consideration by an international and independent authority was needed. It felt that such consideration should not be prejudiced by the advocacy by the United Kingdom of any particular scheme after our submission to the United Nations, though our knowledge and experience were at the disposal of the Assembly. This decision seemed the more necessary because there exist prejudices and suspicions about Britains role in Palestine and these have been expressed over a period in bitter and unfriendly terms. Whatever the British views on possible working arrangements may be, we realised that our efforts in Palestine have failed to secure any accommodation between the two communities and that it was better we should urge no proposals if they were to be suspected of containing some hidden motive calculated to serve some purpose of our own, worthy or unworthy. The Special Committee with some assistance from the factual information we provided have produced their recommendations and many member states have now freely expressed their views on the principles underlying the recommendations.

The position of His Majesty's Government remains to-day as I have just stated. I would repeat however what I made clear in my first statement to this committee - that I cannot easily imagine circumstances in which the United Kingdom would wish to prevent the application of a settlement recommended by the Assembly regarding the future structure of Palestine.

I also made clear I hope where the United Kingdom stood in the matter of implementation of any settlement and of any decision reached by the Assembly. Our singleminded purpose is to end the tragic situation in Palestine. Whether we have any interests in that unhappy land is irrelevant: our anxiety is to facilitate a settlement. The announcement of our decision that we shall make an early withdrawal not only of our forces but also of our administration is designed to remove all lingering doubt, to induce both parties to face up to the consequences of failure to come to an agreement, to emphasise the urgency of the whole matter and to leave the United Nations unhampered in its recommendations as to the best solution for the future Government. It should help to bring home the realities of the situation and bring both sides together. It recognises the place of international authority in liquidating a grave and manacing conflict of interest which is likely to develop in that part of the werld.

Reference: FO 371 61882

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In our judgement a mandatory government may voluntarily relinquish the administration of a mandate.

His Majesty's Government are entitled in view of the general opinion expressed in this committee and also the unworkability of the mandate to lay it down and ask the United Nations because of the conflict and its menacing possibilities to consider how orderly government can be achieved and Palestine move rapidly to self-government and independence - the goal unanimously desired by all the parties and the nations represented here. We have struggled hard for a solution of these difficulties and at the cost of hundreds of lives and considerable wealth. Perhaps in the light of all the advice and criticism offered to us in the past by the nationals of other states, more effective ways of securing the clusive solution we were always seeking may be found. We cannot go on indefinitely faced with the hostility of the parties in Palestine, with fierce misrepresentations outside and with the drain on our own resources.

But no scheme for medifying the clash of rights as they are understood by the parties in Palestine can be divorced from the question of its implementation. It seems to us essential that in determining the nature of a settlement the Assembly should also determine the measures to implement it. It would be unreasonable to ask His Majesty's Government to carry the sole and full responsibility for the administration of Palestine and for enforcing thanges which the United Nations regard as necessary. It has been suggested, as I understand it, that the United Kingdom should carry such responsibility throughout an indefinite transition period until independence is attained, acting under the supervision of the United Nations to enforce United Nations policy and being assisted by a programme of aid as mentioned by the distinguished delegate of the United States, including the possible assistance of a voluntarily recruited international police force. My government desire that is should be clear beyond all goubt and ambiguity that not only is it our decision to wind up the mandate but that within a limited period we shall withdraw. They made only two qualifications. First that in the event of a settlement between Jews and Arabs they would if so desired continue the administration of Palestine through the limited period of the transfer to independence. Second, that they would consider an invitation to participate in giving effect to a settlement in partnership with other members of the United Nations. In short His Majesty's Government will not accept the responsibility for enforcement either alone or in the major role.

They still hope that in view of their firm intention to with draw both the Jewish and Arab communities will be seized with the realities of the situation and appreciate to the full the unhappy consequences that can flow to themselves and their country by failing to agree on the future of Palestine. The United Kingdom Government most earnestly hopes that the

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discussions of the past weeks have revealed the trend of world opinion and the dangers of a continuing struggle between the two peoples and that their representatives and the United Nations will quickly move to some accommodation which will bring harmony and stability in this part of the Middle East. It is a new situation confronting the parties concerned. The weeks of discussion here should make this hope not more unrealistic (as it has been described) but less.

Moreover we trust that anxieties now felt in the Middle East about the present deliberations of the United Nations and their possible outcome will not lead to military preparation or deployment of force amongst the peoples concerned. We hope that no steps will be taken that will be provocative and result in violence. Certainly His Majesty's Government has given and will give no encouragement or assistance to actions which will inflame the situation in the Middle East. Rumours and assertions that any such encouragement has been given are entirely without foundation.

Another dangerous factor in the present situation is the traffic in illegal immigration into Palestine and the connivance of some governments in the provision by their nationals of ships, arms and money to defeat the mandatory in the very difficult task of upholding the rule of law in Palestine. This factor greatly influences the feeling of the Arab world and sets irresponsible influences at work which cannot readily be controlled. In this last period, and in discharge of its duties, the British authorities will have no easy task in controlling the problem of immigration into Palestine particularly in the face of the bitter resentment of one of the parties that immigration continues at all and the indignation of the other that it is far too limited. In any event it must be recognised that the immigration question is one which arouses bitter feelings in Palestine and that proposals for a change in the status que should not be lightly put forward by those who have no responsibility for the consequences. The complications of this problem are known and the difficulties of the mandatory in carrying its difficult and onerous responsibility should not be increased.

My delegation expresses the hope that the Committee will regard as an urgent contribution to the solution of the Palestine problem the resolution we have submitted concerning displaced persons in Europe and particularly that aspect of the matter concerning the absorption of Jews and other displaced persons in countries besides Palestine.

No action is more calculated to help the arab people to a fair appreciation of our sincerity in this problem of refugees abd Jewish displaced persons and our sincerity about the Palestine problem than action on this resolution.

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My government will continue to make available what experience and knowledge it possesses for the use of the United Nations in its search for the solution to this problem. Our resources can be used to assist in arriving at an equitable and just plan. But I should be unfair to the committee if I did not repeat that the sand has started to run and that conclusions should not be unduly delayed and the problem of implementation should be conceived as a parallel study and integral part of the committee's work.

On this last point my government has stated (and it needs to be repeated in view of doubts expressed) that if the Ascembly should recommend a policy which is not acceptable to the Jews and Arabs, some authority alternative to the United Kingdom must be provided in order to implement United Nations policy. If it is desired that His Majesty's Government should participate with others in the enforcement of a settlement - and everything that can be done to bring about a permanent and acceptable solution to all concerned is essential - my government adheres to the views that it must take into account the inherent justice of the settlement and the extent to which force would be required to give effect to it.

But I hope it will be agreed by all delegates that the view of the special committee's report should be upheld that there is urgent need for change of status in Palestine. The withdrawal of the British administration there should if possible proceed by an orderly transfer of power to a suitable authority recognised by the United Nations to usher in independence. Britain in any case is unable to sustain a burden too heavy for any mandatory to discharge, especially when its responsibilities are made the more difficult by the freeden enjayed by the nationals of ather states to employ every means to defeat her efforts. This problem should be atudied at once for it is of the utmost? importance that in the possible absence of agreement between the Jews and Arabs the complicated task of withdrawal should not be the prelude to disorder and disintegration of the public services essential for the normal life of Palestine. Without suitable authorities to negotiate and transfer responsibility to, the preservation of institutions, communications and public works, the observance of law and fundamental services become problems of major difficulty. Some procedure should be worked out by the substitute authority which will ensure proper safeguards for the preservation of good order and the requirements necessary to give effective security forces for the police and other measures which the situation may require.

We hope that when a policy is worked out as representing the consensus of international opinion both parties will respect it and not resort to methods which will destroy security and create chaes and violence in Palestine. In that unhappy eventuality the United Nations must control a situation dangerous to peace. We hope that all concerned will realise that/...

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that their ultimate best interests lie in a settlement that can be worked in goodwill and good neighbourliness. My delegation will have the opportunity of expressing its views on certain of the proposals embodied in the resolutions before the Committee. We desire both now and in the future to live in friendly co-operation with Arabs and Jews alike. I have tried to restate the position of my Government and to suggest that we view our membership of this organisation as a responsibility not lightly carried. Our earnest wish is to be helpful in the great tasks the United Nations was brought into being to discharge. We ask the Committee to act quickly and we hope that the opportunity and the duty confronting the member states will be conceived comprehensively and realistically as well as in a generous spirit. All of us want harmony restored to this hely and tragic land.

[Ends].

Fereign Office please repeat Mest Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram Ne.96.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2984. D. 1.16 p.m. 19th October, 1947. 19th October, 1947. R. 7.50 p.m. 19th October, 1947.

Repeated to High Commissioner Jerusalem, Washington (Saving).

My telegram No. 2959.

Palestine Committee.

Shertok was the only speaker at the 17th neeting on the 17th October and Weizmann the last at the 18th neeting on the 18th. The Arab Higher Committee was offered the second innings on the first day and the first on the second but Janal Husseini elected to speak only once.

2. Shertok described as "the two focal points" in the controversy that Palestine was the only country in which the Jewish people could hope to attain statehood and that the Arabs of Palestine were not a people but a fraction of a larger unit. After dealing with a number of historical arguments he claimed that the Charter could be quoted as effectively in support of the Zionists as of the Arab case. Jewish men and women could not attain equal rights with others unless the Jewish people were placed on a footing of equality with other peoples. They too could invoke the principle of self-determination. Referring to the Arab argument that the future of Palestine should be separated from the resettlement of displaced persons he noted that no Arab State had yet joined I.R.O. The Jewish Agency had decided with a heavy heart to give full consideration to the plan of They had proposals to make the U.N.S.C.O.P. majority. on the boundaries and other aspects of the scheme and hoped for an opportunity to present these at a sub-committee. The area proposed for the Jewish State was, with certain modifications the indispensable minimum. The Agency had been greatly heartened by the American and Russian statements.
The Colonial Secretary's second speech "may or may not have opened a door which his former pronouncement seemed to have practically closed". The United Kingdom had a chance of concluding honourably the chapter of history

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they had initiated with the Balfour declaration. If they took this chance a great deal of the bitterness of recent years would be forgotten.

Husscini began by denying that the Arabs were flouting the Charter - what they were doing was to assert the sacred right of self-defence, itself recognised by the Charter. Nobody had the right to give away their land to a foreign people. Husseini then produced historical authorities in support of the contention challenged by the Zionist spokesmen that the Ashkenazi Jews are not Semitic and consequently not descended from the Palestinian Jews of the Old Testement. Next he defended the Mufti (not unskilfully) and quoted tributes paid by Churchill and Truman to the war effort of the Arab The Jewish Agency insulted the Jewish soldiers who had fought for their various countries by suggesting that they had fought in order to be rewarded by the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. The Soviet delegate had invoked the right of self-determination on behalf of the Jewish minority there, but its concession to them involved denying it to nearly as many Arabs. A Jewish State of a million people would have no chance of survival in the heart of the Arab world, and the Arabs of Palestine would never agree under any pressure to part with any portion of their country. It seemed that "other powers were now labouring under the same illusions" that had caused the British so much trouble. But he did not believe that the present policy of the United States Government represented the true feeling of the American people who would come to see that the enforcement of partition was neither in their interests nor consistent with their traditions.

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4. Weizmann, who had difficulty in reading his typescript, said he had been disappointed to hear that he was not a Jew. After speaking of the origin and intentions of the mandate he said he had long believed that partition was the only practicable compromise. It was not a departure from the mandate but its inevitable consumnation. The question before the Committee was: by whom should the Jewish community be governed - by a Trustee, by the arabs or by itself? Trusteeship was no longer feasible. The great services rendered by Britain "in helping to lay the foundations of Jewish independence" would be remembered when the sordid consequences of the White Paper were forgotten. He was encouraged by the Colonial Secretary's second speech to hope for British participation in bringing the project to a noble conclusion. The second alternative that the Jews should be a minority in an Arab State was morally impossible. A national unit could not be subjected to another people by force in the name of majority rule. Arab Jewish co-operation would be possible only when the Jewish people had attained an equal status. He asked the Committee to consider modifications of the U.N.S.C.O.P. majority plan notably in respect of Western Galilee and the Jewish district of Jerusalem. In considering the problem of implementation he asked them to take full account of "the assistance which our own people can give in making the Jewish State capable of its own defence". They did not anticipate or fear aggression but they hoped the Jewish forces would be "accompanied at the outset by an international force to symbolise the consent and decision of the United Nations".

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to High Commissioner Jerusalem as my telegram No.104.

[Copies sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for retransmission to Jerusalem].

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Mr Warmer 102
Tel. despalabel.

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(MONTAGUE BROWNE)

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Reference:

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| 371 61882

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In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No.

and address-

not to any person by name,

but to-

"The Under-Secretary of State,"
Foreign Office,
London, S.W. 1.

FOREIGN OFFICE,

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FO 371 6188

RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

THE Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his

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B. A. B. B.

Draft. U.K. Delegation, New York.

Telegram.

No.357.7

Dated.O.C.T. 20

Repeat to:

Washington 10829

Jerusalem/

Cypher

Sentences of \$200 Ju 3468

October, 1947.

Despatched M. 20 M.

CONFIDENTIAL

Your telegram No. 2984 [of October 19th: Palestine].

Following for Colonial Secretary from Foreign Secretary.

What passages in your statement Shertok + Weizmann do you think have given Jewish spekesmen the mistaken impression that your second statement was less firm than your first as regards refusal of H.M.G. to accept responsibility for enforcement? You will no doubt take all necessary World Organisation steps to correct this misinterpretation.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

E 9666/951/31 Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3577

20th October, 1947. D.11.20 p.m. 20th October, 1947.

10829 Repeated to Washington Jerusalem

IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL GIANT

Your telegram No. 2984 [of October 19th. Palestine].

Following for Colonial Secretary from Foreign Secretary.

What passages in your statement do you think have given Shertok and Weizmann the mistaken impression that your second statement was less firm than your first as regards refusal of His Majesty's Government to accept responsibility for enforcement? You will no doubt take all necessary steps to correst this misinterpretation by making use of the four last sentences of paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 3468.